Connecting Muslim Knowledge to the German School System by Jonker, G.
Features8 I S I M  N E W S L E T T E R  8 / 0 1
Pr od uct i o n o f K no w l edge
G E R D I E N  J O N K E R
Germany is becoming a multi-faith society at a rapid
pace. The influx of foreign workers and a liberal poli-
cy towards fugitives and asylum-seekers made Islam
the third religious force of the country. As immigrants
become citizens, the Muslim faith is slowly being in-
stitutionalized. In public discourse arguments flare
up, exposing a deeply felt contrariety between the
Christian and Muslim faiths. On the part of the Ger-
man general public, Muslim claims to particularity
(places for prayer in schools, separation for biology
instruction) meet with resistance, as Muslim activity is
suspected of serving political, not religious aims.
Questions are being publicly raised as to whether
Muslim communities should be forced to adopt cul-
tural ideals such as gender equality. The educational
system offers a stage on which this battle over differ-
ence is acted out.
For Germany’s schools religious privatiza-
tion, as signalled by American scholars,
seems to be the only way to make Muslim
particularity socially acceptable. Some thirty
years ago, Peter Berger observed in America
that the pluralization of religion inevitably
led to the privatization of all religions.1 T h e
mechanism behind this societal re-adjust-
ment seemed to be motored by the wish to
live together in peace. When speaking
about core religious questions in public,
people from different religious faiths have
begun to remodel their speech in order not
to be offensive. Religious judgements have
been transposed to a more abstract level,
leaving the explicit religious component
out. In public discourse, ‘hot’ topics like
abortion, pre-marital sex, and homosexuali-
ty nowadays appear to be less under attack
on religious grounds. Rather, their legitima-
cy is increasingly questioned with argu-
ments that touch upon the supposed needs
of society as a whole.2
The conditions
In the German Federal Republic the state
maintains the lead in educational matters,
seeking cooperation with those religious
communities that it acknowledges. In this
legislative arrangement, religious communi-
ties are only responsible for religious con-
tent. Everything else remains the responsibil-
ity of the state. Bremen and Berlin are excep-
tions as these two states have taken steps to
confer religious communities the full respon-
sibility for religious instruction in state
schools including the organization of teacher
training and the development of pedagogi-
cal methods. The state supplies material and
financial support by providing buildings,
heating and electricity and pays 80% of the
teachers’ salaries. After re-unification, most
former socialist states decided that religious
instruction should be once more the respon-
sibility of the state, with the exception of
Brandenburg where religious instruction was
banished from public schools altogether.
Muslim communities who wish to play a
part in public schooling have to adapt to
this legal frame. This is accelerated by the
way legislation is put into practice. As state
money and responsibility is involved, the or-
ganizational model and educational con-
tent are heavily scrutinized by the court.
Judges pose questions to determine
whether an organization is really a religious
community, whether it is able to cooperate
with institutions of the state, and whether
the content is genuinely a product of reli-
gious tradition (and not a result of political
or ideological indoctrination). Particularly
the last question shows a bias, one that has
prevented Muslim organizations from en-
tering the educational system to this day.
In fact, the intricacies of German jurisdic-
tion on the freedom of religion present only
part of the picture, the ongoing process of
secularization comprising the other. Be-
tween 1965 and 1999 the percentage of
churchgoers among the population of the
former Bundesrepublik (West Germany)
dropped from 75% to less than 30%. And, as
the population of socialist Eastern Germany
had been discouraged from religion for two
entire generations, the total of non-practis-
ing Germans duly increased after re-unifica-
tion. This development decreases the coun-
try’s ability to speak about or even recog-
nize religious matters at hand.
In public discourse, teachers unions,
media and the majority of scholars as a rule
express distrust of religious communities
and sometimes declare religiosity a form of
ignorance. When Muslim religiosity is at
issue, many tend to see it as politics in dis-
guise. Of course, there is a xenophobic com-
ponent in their distrust of Islam. This is rein-
forced by representatives of various mi-
grant organizations that promote laicist
views. Kemalists, Alevis and others continue
to stress that Muslim religious organizations
are a threat to democracy. Not surprisingly,
most Muslim religious organizations, but es-
pecially those that are involved in political
issues in the home country – in this case
Turkey – are suspected of serving the inter-
est of Turkish political groups and conse-
quently are accused of being dishonest in
their motives for teaching religion in school.
Part of the media accuses them of under-
cover extremism and indoctrination.3
Churches, on the contrary, increasingly seek
contact with Muslim organizations, seeing
them as natural allies in presenting religious
viewpoints in the public sphere.
The Berlin case
Germany counts 3.2 million Muslims, the
majority of which are of Turkish descent
(75%), predominantly adhering to the Sun-
nite (Hanifi rite) school. Due to a high con-
centration of immigrants from southeast
Anatolia, in Berlin the picture differs. As a
rule Kurds follow the Shafi’i rite and approx-
imately 30% of all Kurds and Turks living in
this city adhere to the Alevi rite, which is a
different brand of Muslim religiosity alto-
gether. In the light of the German legisla-
tion, all Muslim communities have remained
underdeveloped in terms of religious orga-
nization. The law expects religious commu-
nities to develop interior differentiation and
to form expert groups, this being the only
way in which state institutions are able to
cooperate on educational designs.
In November 1998, the Berlin court decid-
ed upon nominal inclusion of the local Islam-
ic Federation into the school system. The Is-
lamic Federation is a single-purpose organi-
zation with the aim of providing the means
for collective religiosity. It lays claim to rep-
resenting all Berlin Muslims. As in other Mus-
lim organizations, individual membership is
rather low but the board of the Federation
mirrors a wide spectrum of Muslim religiosi-
ty in this city. Out of the 71 mosques, 53 – in-
cluding the Shi’ite and the Kurdish Shafi’i –
gave written testimony to the fact that they
feel well represented by the Federation. The
Alevis of Berlin, however, deny the Federa-
tion’s claim, as do all the Turkish citizen or-
ganizations whose members as a rule do not
participate in mosque community life. How-
ever, the Islamic Federation does cooperate
with the Milli Görüsh, a Turkish organization
that claims to sustain Muslim life in general
and for that purpose has set up youth and
women’s organizations within the Federa-
tion mosques. It also offers sustenance in
economic networking and organizes sum-
mer schools and religious festivals. Kemal-
ists, Alevis and the general German public
demonstrate a strong distrust of the Milli
Görüsh because of its (former) association
with the Islamist parties in Turkey.
As yet, the court decision has not yet been
turned into practice. Because of its connec-
tions to Milli Görüsh, the Federation has not
been able to gain access to any of the Berlin
schools. Moreover, it is still in the process of
preparing teachers and schedules. Nonethe-
less, the 1998 court decision was an incentive
for Muslims all over the country to develop
educational plans and for local administra-
tions to develop tools for communication.
Muslim organizations in Berlin, Hessen,
Northrhine-Westphalia, Bavaria and Baden-
Würthemberg, all agreeing upon the so-
called ‘Four plus One’ formula (Four Sunni
law schools plus one Shi’a) but excluding
Alevis and Ahmadiyya, now have produced
proposals for educational programmes. Fur-
thermore, administrations of these states
organized informal working groups as fu-
ture instruments for cooperation. In Berlin,
proceedings seem to be well under way. Its
law on freedom of religion, being different
from that of other states, allowed more
room for religious partners.
The Berlin Working Group (of which the
author is part) was established early in 2000
and consists of members of the Islamic Fed-
eration, representatives of Christian and
Jewish teacher training programmes, repre-
sentatives of the State School Authority,
politicians and scholars. In its meetings the
Islamic Federation explains its educational
plans and discusses particulars with those
present. Core issues comprise inter-reli-
gious co-existence, flexibility in gender is-
sues, individual rights and abstinence from
political goals. As the Federation continues
to cooperate with Milli Görüsh, doubts of its
ability to solve these issues slow down pro-
c e d u r e s .
In this way, a proposal for religious in-
struction – the outcome of internal religious
considerations – is being put to test by edu-
cational and religious experts, politicians
and administrators who do not necessarily
belong to the religious community in-
volved. Of course other candidates, Jews,
Mormons, Unitarians, and Humanists, now
teaching in state schools were also ques-
tioned prior to admission. Questions aim to
connect the school teachings of a particular
religious tradition to the mainstream of Ger-
many – including its secular tradition, em-
phasis on individual rights, or gender equal-
ity – which in itself comprises abstractions
of diverse religious and ideological tradi-
tions and tendencies. As a consequence the
predominantly Christian and secular mem-
bers are in the position to define the main
goals and methods. And where Muslims are
concerned, non-Muslims often demonstrate
a high degree of subjectivity.
For the representatives of the Islamic Fed-
eration, proceedings in the working group
bear the consequence that they are obliged
to make adjustments in the educational plan
and also in places where their following ex-
pects clear religious instruction. To solve this
problem, the proposal now sometimes re-
sorts to ‘humanist’ reasoning. Those respon-
sible now distinguish between what is com-
municated to the community and what is
communicated to ‘the outside world’, in-
cluding the public schools. Thus, whenever a
topic appears to be very sensitive – different
treatment of the sexes, or headscarves – it
dissociates from strictly religious arguments
and points to the responsibility of the indi-
vidual believer instead. A shift to the privati-
zation of religion can thus be seen taking its
course. In the long run, this shift may well
connect Islamic knowledge to the German
educational system, and through this to the
acceptance of Islam.
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